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After five years in the planning stage, the Chicago-Board Options 
Exchange (CBOE), on April 26, 1973, commenced operation for a 
pilot period.1 The CBOE, the nation's first exchange devoted exclu-
sively to options trading and the first to trade options since the passage2 
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 potentially represents the most 
significant development in the securities industry since the introduction 
of mutual funds. The genesis of a new investment market capable of 
generating new commissions for the brokerage industry, 4 coupled with 
the CBOE's early success in attracting investors, 5 has interested several 
national exchanges-most notably the American Stock Exchange and 
the PBW Stock Exchange. 6 The CBOE's debut has also attracted the 
1. Berton, Options Trading: A Booming New Market, FINANCIAL WoRLD, June 20, 
1973, at 25. The Chicago Board of Trade approved in principle the formation of an 
affiliate options exchange in October 1971. Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1971, at 4, col. 4. The 
Securities and Exchange Commission approved the registration of the options exchange 
on February 1, 1973. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 1973), 
[1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.1f 79,212. 
2. See Gates, The Developing Option Market: Regulatory Issues and New Investor 
Interest, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 421,421-31 (1973). · 
3. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78 et seq. (1970). 
4. See The Big Action in Options, DuNs, Oct. 1973, at 57. 
5. Prior to the creation of the CBOE, the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers As-
sociation sold at most four thousand contracts per week in the over-the-counter market. 
Berton, supra note 1. During October 1973 alone, CBOE trading nearly equalled over-
the-counter volume for all of 1972. Option Plays Are Spreading, Bus. WEEK, Dec. 22, 
1973, at 104. By March 1974 volume on the exchange averaged 16,800 contracts per 
day. Laing, New Game in Town, Wall St. J., April 22, 1974, at 1, col. 6. The CBOE 
achieved this spectacular record despite a declining market. Id. In the rising market 
of May 1975 the CBOE's volume reached 63,000 contracts per day. Wall St. J., May 
14, 1975, at 21, col. 1. Such a large increase, however, falls far short of the New York 
Stock Exchange's volume of 250,000 100-share blocks traded daily. 
6. Option Plays Are Spreading, supra note 5; Turov, New Look in Calls, 53 
BARRoN's, Aug. 6, 1973, at 9. The SEC has recently permitted the American Stock Ex-
change to engage in options trading. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,144 
(Dec. 19, 1974), [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1T 80,034 (1974). The PBW 
Stock Exchange received tentative approval to begin options trading on June 1, 1975. 
Wall St. J., March 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2. PBW does not yet list options, as do CBOE 
andAMEX. 
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attention of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the 
Federal Reserve Board (FRB), both of which Congress has ordained 
to protect the investor and assure a fair market. 7 
The development of a substantial options market poses special 
risks to investors and to the securities market. 8 Failing to understand 
the market mechanics, the investor risks encountering more precipitous 
losses in options than in other securities trading. Furthermore, both 
the instability of options prices and the dislocation of credit reserves 
caused by heavy speculation in options threaten other securities 
markets. To protect the investor and ensure a climate of fairness and 
economic efficiency, both the SEC and the FRB have recently moved 
to curb the unfavorable effects of options trading. The SEC, having 
perceived the posture of options trading in the larger securities market 
and its particular suitability to experimentation, 9 has fashioned a num-
ber of innovative and potentially far-reaching proposals. It has 
promulgated rule 9b-1, 10 describing the SEC's power to formulate rules 
for options exchanges; proposed rule 9b-2, 11 pertaining to disclosure 
and suitability requirements for options trading; and proposed rule 
238,12 providing an exemption from options registration. The FRB, 
meanwhile, has modified its margin requirements to make certain that 
options have no loan value, 13 purportedly to prevent misallocation of 
the nation's credit reserves. This comment evaluates the wisdom and 
effectiveness of the agencies' recent custodial demarche. . 
I. The Mechanics of Options Trading 
The two fundamental types of options, 14 the call and the put, grant 
the holder the right to purchase (call) or sell (put) the underlying 
stock at a specified price, the striking price, at any time within the con-
7. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g ( 1970). 
8. See Proposal to Adopt Rule 9b-1, SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34-
9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. RE. ~ 79,171. 
9. E.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973), [1973-
1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE.~ 79,604. 
10. 17 C.P.R.§ 240.9b-1 (1974). 
11. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2, 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973 ), 2 CCH FED. SEc. 
L. RE . ~ 22,623 (1973). 
12. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed. 
Reg. 1283 ( 1974 ), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEC. L. RE.~ 79;602. 
13. 12 C.P.R. § 220.126 (1975). 
14. For discussion of options investment strategies, see B. MALKIEL & R. QUA:NDT, 
STRATEGIES AND RATIONAL DECISIONS IN THE SECURITIES OPTIONS MARKET 34-72 (1969). 
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tract period. The striking price usually approaches the underlying 
stock's market value at the time of the sale of the call or put. 
The capital outlay for options investing is much less than the 
requisite investment for trading in the underlying stock, in that the 
price paid for the option, the premium, typically equals only a small 
percentage of the striking price. Suppose, for example, that the price 
of the underlying stock for a call with a ten percent premium rises from 
a $100 striking price to $150. The stock trader buying at $100 and 
selling at $150 would realize a profit of $50, or fifty percent (excluding 
commissions1 5 ). The call buyer, however, buying the option for $10, 
executing it when the underlying stock reached $150, and subsequently 
selling the stock at $150, would realize a profit of $40, or four hundred 
percent. Thus, the options buyer commits much less capital than the 
purchaser of common stock, and yet gains the opportunity for com-
parable profits. Investor interest stems chiefly from these leverage 
benefits of options trading. 
Unfortunately, leverage works two ways; the options buyer may 
lose his entire investment if he cannot exercise his option profitably. 
Had the stock in the above example declined from $100 to $50, the 
call buyer would have lost his $10 investment; he would surely have 
chosen not to exercise the call, because so doing would have com-
pounded the loss. A stock trader, on the other hand, retains the stock 
and the hope that someday its price will rise enough at least to cover 
his investment. 
In contrast, the options seller, or "writer," often a wealthy 
individual, seeks to capitalize on these purchasing risks by selling op-
tions that the buyer will not likely exercise. Options writing mitigates 
the writer's risk of loss from downturn in the market price of the under-
lying stock, because the premium amount is guaranteed as a minimum 
return. In a declining market the amount of the premium reduces the 
writer's paper loss; in a rising market the writer's gain is limited to 
15. Commissions on options trading approximate those involved in trading other 
securities. For a trade involving $100 to $799 the options commission would be 1.3% 
plus $12 whereas the minimum stock commission on 100-share orders would be 2.0% 
plus $6.40; for a trade involving $800 to $2499 the options commission is l.3o/o plus 
$12 whereas the stock commission is 1.5% plus $15; and for a trade involving $2500 
to $4777 the options commission and the stock commission are both 0.9% plus $22. 
Compare Chicago Board Option Exchange Clearing Corporation, Prospectus, at 28 
(April 26, 1974) [hereinafter cited as Prospectus], with 29 STANDARD & PooR's CoRP., 
SECURllY OWNER's STOCK GUIDE, April1975, at 254. 
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the premium amount.16 Generally, options writers reap greater profits 
than options buyers, 17 in that writers realize a return regardless of stock 
fluctuations. 18 
Prior to the organization of the CBOE, investors traded options 
in complicated and awkward fashion via the over~the-counter market.19 
Lacking a central exchange, brokers advertised by newspaper and word 
of mouth. 20 In search of the lowest premium, the customer's broker 
canvassed various options dealers, thereby increasing the overhead 
cost. 21 Poor communication also meant that in almost every case the 
writer wrote each option contract anew,22 with little attention paid to 
previous options' valuations. Options prices lacked uniformity, and 
few, if any, were interchangeable; the climate was wholly unsuitable 
for the survival of a secondary market. The options buyer c;ould profit 
only by exercising the option and compelling the writer to fulfill the 
contract by relinquishing his interest in the stock. 
Through its subsidiary, the Chicago Board Options Exchange 
Clearing Corporation (CBOECC), the CBOE now intervenes between 
writer and buyer, issuing the options itself. The writer thus contracts 
directly with the CBOECC, 23 whereas the buyer, instead of looking to 
the writer for performance, looks to the exchange subsidiary as the 
options issuer. The CBOE has also eliminated the overhead cost and 
nonliquidity problems of the traditional options market by standardizing 
contracts, 24 making them freely intetchangeable, so as to facilitate the 
16. Snyder, Puts and Calls, CoM. & FINANCIAL CHRoNICLE, May 8, 1969, § 2, at 43. 
17. Chicago Board Options: Under Water?, 112 FORBES, July 15, 1973, at 66; see 
C. ROSENBERG, STOCK MARKET PRIMER 118 (1974). 
18. See Gates, supra note 2, at 422. 
19. ld. at 426-32; see Anderson, Chicago Options, 27 Bus. LAW. 7, 9 (1971) . 
The options markets cannot yet trade puts and can only trade calls for a limited 
selection of underlying stocks. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 
1973 ) , [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 'If 79,212, at 82,670 
(CBOE); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,144 (Dec. 19, 1974), [Current 
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 'II 80,034, at 84,800 (1974) (American); Wall St. J ., 
March 21, 1975, at 4, col. 2 (PBW). Investors therefore still trade numerous calls 
and all puts over the counter. 
20. Berton, supra note 1, at 26. 
21. Anderson, supra note 19, at 9. 
22. See Gates, supra note 2, at 427. 
23. Prospectus, supra note 15, at 22. 
24. The CBOE has standardized options by. requiring that the option periods, the 
longest of which may be nine months, must uniformly end on the last day of April, July, 
October, or January. Over-the-counter options carry comparable restrictions; however, 
these periods may end on any date upon which the writer 'and buyer agree. In addition, 
the striking price must be a multiple of $5 for an underlying stock valued at under $50; 
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establishment of a secondary market. The secondary options market 
has stimulated enormous interest, because purchasers may now realize 
profits without paying the stock's option price. Furthermore, they pay 
substantially lower brokerage commission fees on the premium amount, 
rather than on the purchase-sale of the stock itself. 25 As a further sec-
ondary market advantage, the writer may withdraw from the market 
simply by purchasing the same type. of options he has written. 
Before interest in options trading awakened, government regula-
tion had waned. During the 1920's the option became a manipulators' 
tool. Options served to ensure a cheap stock supply and spur activity 
in a single security, usually by circulating rumors designed to increase 
or decrease the price. 26 These practices generated such intense public 
concern that an early draft of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
banned options altogether. 27 The put and call brokers then organ-
ized, 28 and replied by emphasizing such options' benefits as writers' 
guaranteed premium returns. In response, Congress simply prohibited 
certain nonoptions manipulative devices29 and authorized the SEC to 
make necessary options rules.30 Prior to the organization of the CBOE, 
the SEC never exercised that power;31 instead it acquiesced in self-
$10 for one valued between $50 and $100; and $20 for one valued over $100. Berton, 
supra note 1, at 27. There is usually only one striking price per underlying stock, but 
if the market price exceeds a multiple, a writer may offer a second option for the same 
period at a new striking price. High Leverage in New Option Exchange, 39 FINANCIAL 
WoRLD, Feb. 28, 1973, at 7. The underlying stock must appear on the New York Stock 
Exchange with a minimum price of $10, and must have traded in volume of at least 
one million shares for each of the two preceding years. The corporation itself must is-
sue a minimum of ten million shares and list 10,000 shareholders. Berton, supra note 
1. 
25. Berton, supra note 1, at 26. 
26. SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, STOCK ExCHANGE PRACTICES, S. 
REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 30-55 (1934); SENATE COMM. ON BANKING AND 
CuRRENCY, F EDERAL SECURITIES ExCHANGE ACT OF 1934, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 
2d Sess. 9, 17 (1934); HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECU-
RmES ExcHANGE BILL OF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11, 21 
(1934 ) . 
27. S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a)(9) (1934), reprinted in 11 J. ELLENBERGER 
& E. MAHAR, LEGISLATIVE HisTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES Ex-
CHANGE ACT OF 1934 (1973). 
28. B. MALKIEL & R. QuANDT, supra note 14, at 12. 
29. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a) (1970). Prohibited 
devices included (1) wash sales and matched orders of securities, (2) the illusion of 
active trading to induce others to trade, (3) the technique of disseminating information 
that a stock will fluctuate in order to induce a trade, ( 4) methods of spreading false 
information, and (5) price fixing by artificial transactions. 
30. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 9(b)-(c) , 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b)-(c) (1970). 
31. In its first two years the SEC held conferences and conducted studies to de-
termine the extent to which it should allow option trading. The Commission investi-
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regulation by the Put and Call Brokers and Dealers Association. 32 
II. SEC Authority to Regulate Options Exchanges 
When the CBOE proposed to register as a national securities 
exchange, the SEC theorized that the novelty of options trading, its 
complex problems and its special risks to the investor warranted a 
departure from usual registration procedures permitting exchanges to 
initiate their own rules. 33 Certain securities operations under the tradi-
tional regulatory scheme had degenerated somewhat, 34 and, confronted 
with a nascent market devoid of entrenched institutions, the Commis-
sion may have considered the moment propitious for assuming a more 
aggressive and definitive role in exchange regulation. Implementing 
its authority to classify exchanges35 and promulgate protective options 
exchange rules,36 the SEC adopted rule 9b-l,37 delegating to itself the 
gated trading practices, registration of options dealers, reports concerning the granting 
or acquiring of options, the duration of options, and endorsement of options by exchange 
members. 2 SEC ANN. REP. 15 (1936); 1 SEC ANN. REP. 16 (1935). The SEC never 
adopted any rules, however, adjudging its other antimanipulative weapons sufficiently ef-
fective, and declining to further hamper legitimate options usages. 3 L. Loss, SECu-
RITIES REGULATION 1544 (2d ed. 1961). The Commission has conducted studies of op-
tions from time to time in conformity with its responsibilities under sections 9(b) and 
9(c) of the 1934 Act, the most recent and notable study having been conducted in 1961. 
27 SEC ANN. REP. 67 (1961). Because section 9(b) only forbids conduct contrary to 
SEC rules, the absence of any SEC-promulgated options regulation might preclude a vi-
olation of the statute. See In re Harold T. White, 3 S.E.C. 466, 535-37 (1938). 
32. B. MALKIEL & R. QUANDT, supra note 14, at 12. The New York Stock Exchange 
adopted rules that had been drafted in contemplation of the passage of the Securities 
Exchange Act: each member who knew about a substantial option trade relating to 
listed securities had to file a report; no specialist could deal in options based on the 
underlying stock in which he was registered; no member could deal in options on the 
floor; and no member could initiate, on the floor, an options deal in which he had an 
interest. 3 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 1545 & n.49. 
33. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973 ), 38 Fed. Reg. 
1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1T 79,171. The new 
procedure would allow close supervision of the CBOE during its experimental stage. 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973 ), 38 Fed. Reg. 34,665 
(1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1T 79,604. The SEC did 
not intend to alter other exchanges' self-regulatory schemes, but merely decided that op-
tions exchanges required closer regulation. /d. 
34. The SEC had recently failed to evoke voluntary adoption of an exchange rule 
requiring that members conduct a large percentage of their business with the public. See 
SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 3902 
(1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1T 79,178. 
35. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970) . 
36. Id. §§ 9(b)-(c), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b)-(c). 
37. 17 C.P.R.§ 240.9b-1 (1974). Rule 9b-1, in relevant part, states: 
(a) It shall be unlawful for a national securities exchange ... to effect any 
transactions in an option . . . except in accordance with a plan . . . that is 
declared effective by the Commission . . . . 
( 1 ) Before an exchange . . . may effect any transaction in options . . . the 
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power to initiate an options exchange's regulations. Rule 9b-1 pro-
hibits a national exchange from trading in options without prior 
submission of a plan to the SEC so that interested parties can respond. 
The Commission may then require the exchange to "alter, amend, 
supplement, or rescind" the submission. 38 The plan must include the 
exchange's "regulations, rules, by-laws, constitutional provisions and 
other requirements" concerning options, 39 and must also detail methods 
for clearing transactions, regulating members who trade for their own 
account, endorsing options, reporting transactions, and listing trading 
privileges. 40 The 9b-1 requirement raises three questions: whether 
investors need the protection the SEC seeks to provide through the 
rule; whether the rule \vill prove effective in regulating options 
exchanges; and whether the SEC had the authority to enact rule 
9b-1. 
Investors do require the protection the SEC seeks to provide by 
rule 9b-l. The threat to investors that necessitated section 9 of the 
exchange shall propose and file with the Commission a plan regulating trans-
actions in options on the exchange. . . . 
(2) The Commission shall give prompt notice of any proposal filed by an ex-
change to alter, amend, supplement, or rescind a plan in effect . . . and the 
proposed change shall become effective upon the 30th day after notice has been 
given by the Commission . . . unless the Commission shall disapprove the 
change ... . 
(3) ... (T]he Commission may require that an exchange alter, amend, sup-
plement, or rescind its plan . . . to the extent that the Commission finds to 
be necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of in-
vestors. 
( 4) The Commission may take action under any provision of this paragraph 
(a) without notice and opportunity for interested persons to submit written 
data, views or arguments . . . for good cause . . . . 
(b) Plans . . . shall contain . . . the regulations, rules, by-laws, constitutional 
provisions and other requirements of the exchange that relate solely . . . to 
transactions in options on the exchange, and shall include provisions relating 
~ 
( 1) effecting transactions in options on the exchange by members thereof for 
their own account and the accounts of customers; 
(2) the clearance or settlement of transactions in options; 
(3) the endorsement and guarantee of performance of options; 
( 4) the reporting of transactions in options; and 
(5) the listing and delisting of, and the admission to and removal of trading 
privil'eges on the exchange for, options. . . . 
The rule became effective on January 17, 1974. 39 Fed. Reg. 1261 (1974). The 
original proposal would have only indirectly regulated exchange rules by forbidding 
members to trade on noncomplying exchanges. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 10,397 (Sept. 21, 1973), l8 Fed. Reg. 26,943 (1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEc. L. RE.~ 79,517. 
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1(a)(3) (1974). 
39. Id. § 240.9b-l(b). 
40. Id. 
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Securities Exchange Act,41 coupled with recent failures in self-regula-
tion procedures, 42 urge the imposition of permanent safeguards. More-
over, options trading has captivated a virtual throng of neophytes, 
intent upon plotting a nickle-and-dime course to glorious fortune. 43 
Absent SEC intervention, these novices could suffer financial de-
vastation at the hands of unscrupulous dealers; furthermore the price 
instability resulting from widespread, careless investment could injure 
legitimate investors' interests. 44 
The SEC presently protects investors in traditional equity securi-
ties by allowing exchanges voluntarily to ·adopt rules consistent with the 
Exchange Act. 45 Although the exchanges independently self-regulate 
in lieu of SEC review,46 the Commission can revoke an exchange's 
registration upon violation of the Act or a regulation.47 Moreover, the 
Commission may alter or supplement exchange rules only on specified 
statutory grounds and only if the exchange fails to comply with an SEC 
request. 48 The SEC also requires the reporting of any rule changes, 
but, because a failure to report does not affect the validity of any ex-
change rule, 49 the requirement is virtually impotent. In the past the 
Commission has refrained from actively tampering with particular rules 
of exchanges that typically complied voluntarily with SEC sugges-
41. See materials cited note 29 supra. 
42. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973 ), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 3902 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE. ~ 79,178. 
43. Maidenberg, "Calls" Get Big Play on Exchange in Chicago, N.Y. Times, Sept. 
2, 1973, § ,Ill, at 13, col. 1 (unsophisticated investors have been attracted to options 
trading); see N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1974, at 34, col. 2 (SEC Commissioner stated gambl-
ing is motive of options traders); see also Wall St. J., May 23, 1975, at 1, col. 6 (return 
of small investors to options market after bear· market). But see N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 
1975, at 51 , col. 2 (CBOE study indicating that investors in options are highly sophisti-
cated group) . Such conflicting characterizations of the options market may result from 
the different perspectives from which the various observers view regulation. 
44. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973 ), 38 Fed. Reg. 
1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE.~ 79,171. 
45. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 6(c) , 15 U.S.C. § 78f(c) (1970) . 
46. See 2 L. Loss, supra note 31 , at 1171-73. 
47. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19(a) (1), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a) (1) (1970). 
48. Id. § 19(b) , 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b). The specified grounds include (1) safeguards 
with respect to exchange members' financial responsibility, (2) limitation of the trading 
of stock for a certain period after issuance, (3) listing of stocks, ( 4) hours of trading, 
(5) solicitation of business, (6) fictitious accounts, (7) settlement of accounts, (8) re-
porting transactions of the exchange, (9) fixing reasonable rates, (10) minimum units 
of trading, (11) odd-lot trades, (12) margin accounts, and (13) similar matters. See 
e.g., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973 ), 38 Fed. Reg. 1646 
(1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE.~ 79,171. 
49. 17 C.P.R.§ 240.17a-8 (1974). 
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tions. 50 More recently, however, the Commission has proposed in-
creasingly radical innovations, such as the "institutional membership" 
rule51 and fully negotiated commissions, 52 and has either failed ,to ob-
tain voluntary compliance, 53 encountered widespread industry resist-
ance, 54 or stumbled over formalistic delay tactics. 55 
In this context, the SEC's decision to formulate new rulemaking 
procedures for options exchanges was necessary and sensible. Under 
the auspices of the Administrative Procedure Act, 56 the SEC em-
powered itself to amend exchange rules rapidly. 57 Given the novelty 
of options and their unknown effect on the securities market, the SEC 
must utilize that power, often to the point of subitaneous intervention 
in exchange affairs, so as to counter the pedestrian pace of self-regula-
tion, preserve the status quo of market constancy, and expedite the 
evaluation of experimental results. Furthermore, lessons gleaned from 
initiating options trading rules will assist the Commission in devising 
an alternative to the cumbersome voluntary rulemaking procedures 
curren.tly governing traditional exchanges. 
· In response to the second question-whether rule 9b-l will, in 
fact, prove effective-the SEC may have failed to reserve the authority 
necessary to regulate options exchanges properly.58 Rule 9b-l(a)(3) 
applies only to an exchange's initial plan: the language merely pro-
hibits options trading before SEC approval of the plan.59 Apparently, 
50. Cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973 ), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 3902 (1973 ), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1f 79,178. 
51. See PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718, 734 n.3 (3d Cir. 1973 ), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974). 
52. Address by Ray Garrett, Chairman of the SEC, ABA 56th Nat'l Trust Con-
ference, Miami Beach, Florida, Jan. 28, 1975, [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. 
REP.1f 80,085 (1975) . 
53. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9950 (Jan. 16, 1973 ), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 3902 (1973), [1 972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1T 79,178. 
54. Cf. N.Y. Times, Jan. 23 , 1975, at 47, col. 4. 
55. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973 ) , 38 Fed. 
Reg. 34,665 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.1T 79,604. 
56. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1970). 
57. 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1(a)(4) (1974). 
58. Effective rulemaking also includes the capability of designing rules that work. 
This would include whether the SEC possesses sufficient manpower to carry out the 
necessary investigations; however, the SEC currently relies upon a review of options ex-
changes' plans for the needed information. 
59. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 240.9b-1(a)(2) ("rescind a plan in effect"), with id. § 
240.9b-1(a )(3) ("rescind its plan"). The absence of the phrase "in effect" in rule 9b-
1 (a)(3) indicates that the exchange rulemaking power of the Commission applies only 
to a plan not yet in effect·. Rule 9b-1(a)(2) does allow the Commission to regulate 
an exchange's alteration of its own options rules. 
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stock exchanges may still adopt rules consistent with the Securities Ex-
change Act in the wake of the Commission's declared intent not to sup-
plant the self-regulatory exchange functions. 60 By the terms of rule 
9b-1 (a) (2), however, the SEC may supervise any modifications made 
by the exchange after the Commission's approval of the initial plan. 
Yet the language arguably authorizes subsequent supervision by the 
SEC only in the face of affirmative, amendatory action by the exchange, 
thereby suggesting that the Commission would be powerless to inter-
vene spontaneously and enforce modifications in the exchange's experi-
mental plan. Clearly, however, the SEC interprets the rule differently 
and envisions a more active supervisory role. 61 To preclude an 
unfavorable judicial interpretation, the SEC could simply amend the 
rule, molding the language to a precise articulation of the Commission's 
intent. 
Yet the question remains whether the SEC has authority to prom-
ulgate such a rule. Even with a clearer rule, the SEC must answer 
the contention that section 19 of the Exchange Act, 62 which delineates 
SEC powers over exchanges and securities, overrides and restricts the 
Commission's power to alter an established exchange's rules. 63 Under 
section 19, the SEC formerly claimed the authority to promulgate ex-
change rules when deemed necessary for the protection of investors. o-l 
Ensuing litigation failed to resolve the authority issue and failed also 
to establish a test for the validity of the investor-protection claim. The 
SEC had wielded rule 19b-265 as its vehicle for requiring that all 
regulated exchanges adopt rules conditioning exchange membership on 
willingness to serve the public.66 In PBW Stock Exchange, Inc. v. 
60. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,552 (Dec. 13, 1973 ) , 38 Fed. Reg. 
34,665 ( 1973 ), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE.~ 79,604. 
61. The SEC shall have the "opportunity to comment upon all proposed plans and 
proposed changes in effective plans." /d. The SEC " ... may by order require the 
adoption, amendment, alteration, or rescission of any rule of a national securities ex-
change .... " SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 1646 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ~ 79,171. 
Speculation as to the efficacy of the rule as envisioned by the SEC is only tentative at 
this tinle and does not obviate the need to compare the literal wording with the Commis-
sion's apparent intentions. 
62. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(a)-(b) (1970). 
63. Cf. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973 ), cert. denied, 
416 u.s. 969 (1974). 
64. Id. 
65. 17 C.P.R.§ 240.19b-2 (1974). 
66. The rule dictates that a member must conduct eighty percent of his transactions 
with the public. /d. 
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SEC,67 plaintiff exchange attacked rule 19b-2, contending that Con-
gress, in passing the Securities Exchange Act, denied the Commission 
rulemaking power by deleting the authorization68 from the bill's final 
version. 611 The PBW Stock Exchange further argued that the SEC had 
no power to alter or supplement an established exchange's rules, except 
as provided in section 19, which purports to safeguard investors rather 
than brokers.70 The Commission responded71 by quoting section 23(a) 
of the Act, which states that the SEC may "make such rules and regu-
lations as may be necessary for the execution of ,the functions" author-
ized by the Act. 72 Although the Supreme Court has held that com-
parable clauses in other acts grant broad powers,73 the PBW court 
never resolved whether the SEC can supplement an exchange's rules, 
inasmuch as it dismissed the petition on jurisdictional grounds.74 Thus, 
the third question-whether under section 19 the SEC had the authority 
to enact rule 9b-1-remains unsettled, and, because it invades a province 
once reserved to exchange members, the authority issue may spur further 
litigation. 
Rule 9b-1 will likely not fall to a PBW-type attack for several 
reasons. First, the SEC has yet to establish a fully nonexperimental 
options exchange;75 thus, there are no powerful institutions intent upon 
protecting their income sources through litigation, as in PBW. 76 Sec-
ond, the rule purposes to protect investors, a goal that conforms with 
the general aims of the Exchange Act; rule 19b-2, however, was 
67. 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 969 (1974), noted in 52 
TEXAS L. REv. 1014 (1974). 
68. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 18(c) (1934). 
69. Brief for Petitioner at 24-26, PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d 
Cir. l973 ) . In so arguing, petitioner attempted to frame rule 19b-2 as merely an admin-
istrative order. 
70. ld. at 20-21, 28-33. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 19, 15 U.S.C. § 
78n (1970). Rule 19b-2 protects brokers by providing increased commission from insti-
tutional il'lvestors who must now trade as members of the public. 
71. Brief for Respondent at 34, PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d 
Cir. 1973). 
72. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 23(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78w(a) (1970). 
73. American Trucking Ass'ns v. United States, 344 U.S. 298, 311-12 (1953); ac-
cord, Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268, 280-81 (1969); United States v. 
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 177-78 (1968); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 
390 u.s. 747, 787 (1968). 
74. PBW Stock Exch., Inc. v. SEC, 485 F.2d 718 (3d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 
U.S. 969 (1974 ). The court abstained from reviewing the merits of the case because 
a "regulation" rather than an "order" was involved. 
75. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9985 (Feb. 1, 1973 ), [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] CCH F'Eo. SEC. L. RE.~ 79,212, at 82,670. 
76. Options trading has gained in attractiveness, however, and a number of these 
institutions appear eager to enter the field. Option Plays Are Spreading, supra note 5, 
at 106. 
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designed to aid brokers. Third, the SEC will likely exercise the power 
only in important actions, in light of the present staffs reluctance about 
policing several options exchanges as opposed to one central ex-
change.77 Fourth, unlike section 19, which grants limited rulemaking 
power,78 section 9(b) authorizes the SEC to formulate any options-
related rule necessary to protect investors. The Commission, however, 
would likely prefer to sustain its affirmative rulemaking role on a basis 
broader than section 9(b): only section 19's general provision will 
support extension of the aggressive approach beyond options, to stock 
exchanges generally. 
III. SEC Information Requirements 
One of the SEC's primary objectives is to ensure that investors 
have suitable access to risk and financial information, so that they may 
make knowledgeable, rational decisions whether to invest in the highly 
risky undertaking of options trading. To achieve this end the SEC 
possesses two methods-requiring registration of options under the Se-
curities Act, 79 and regulating options trading under the Securities 
Exchange Act. 80 
A. Present Options Information Requirements 
Current SEC rules temporarily permit the utilization of an infor-
mation system for options similar to that used for other types of securi-
ties trading, i.e., registration of the securities, presentation of a 
prospectus, and delivery of the certificate. 81 Options registration poses 
two questions: does the SEC possess the authority to require such 
registration, and, if so, what should be the nature and extent of dis-
closure required? 
The SEC probably does possess the authority to require options 
registration. Before the CBOE begat the options craze, the SEC had 
never required registration of puts and calls, because it did not recog-
nize puts and calls as "securities" under the Securities Act. 82 The se-
77. /d. 
78. The SEC has not abandoned the idea that section 19 of the Securities Exchange 
Act grants exchange rulemaking power similar to that of section 9. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 9930 (Jan. 9, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 1646 (1973), [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1[ 79,171. 
79. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1970). 
80. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1970). 
81. Securities Act of 1933 § 5(b) (2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b}(2) (1970). 
82. Anderson, supra note 19, at '13. 
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curities acts include within their definition of a security a "right to sub-
scribe to or purchase a security,"83 a definition that should encompass 
the call,84 and the SEC now requires their registration.85 A more dif-
ficult question is the SEC's authority to regulate puts. Recently the 
SEC has indicated that it intends to treat puts as securities also. In 
defining the expression, "equity securities," in rule 3all-l,86 the SEC 
included puts for "the purpose of clarity."87 One federal court, in 
holding that a put does qualify as a security, seized upon the rule's lan-
guage, to facilitate the finding of a fraud violation. 88 Little opposition 
to the inclusion of options within the security definition has evolved, 
because even if the term "security" does not include options, the SEC 
can still require options registration by formulating a rule under section 
9(b) of the Securities Exchange Act, which authorizes the Commission 
to make whatever options rules it deems appropriate to the public in-
terest.89 
Options registration poses a fundamental problem: should de-
tailed disclosures be required, and to what extent? The SEC has not 
provided options registration forms, nor has it acted to enforce registra-
tion. 90 The Commission has also yet to determine what information 
the issuer should include in the registration, although its approval of 
83. Securities Act of 1933 § 2(1), 15 U.S.C. § 77(b)(1) (i970); Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 § 3 (a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a) (10) (1970). The "security" definition 
was intended to be the same in the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act. See 
SENATE CoMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FEDERAL SECURITIES ExCHANGE Acr OF 
1934, S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1934). But see 1 L. Loss, supra note 
31, at 479. 
84. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 258 F. Supp. 262, 292 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), 
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976 
(1969) (stock option is a security). 
85. Dean Witter & Co., [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 
78,602. A registered broker desired to assist in call option writing without registering 
and requested a no-action position from the SEC. The Commission determined that, 
absent an exemption, call options could not be sold to the public without registration, 
but it did not pass on the nature or extent of disclosure necessary. ld. See generally 
1 L. Loss, supra note 31, at 469. 
86. 17 C.P.R. § 240.3all-1 (1974). 
87. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 
11,449 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.1179,196. 
88. Vogel-Lorber, Inc. v. Options on Shares, Inc., [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. 
L. REP.1194,911 (S.D.N.Y. 1974). 
89. 15 u.s.c. § 78i(b) (1970). 
90. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed. Reg. 1283 
(1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,602. The Commis-
sion has, however, encouraged inquiries into what kinds of disclosures would best serve 
registration of puts and calls on current forms. See Dean Witter & Co., supra note 85. 
See also Gates, supra note 2, at 438. 
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the CBOECC prospectus offers an indication of the SEC's posture. 
The CBOECC, which issues and endorses91 CBOE options, devotes 
most of its prospectus to risk and financial data concerning options trad-
ing in general, referring only vaguely to information about the underly-
ing stock.92 Several reasons explain the SEC's acquiescence in not 
specifying the information desired. Although the buyer has a special 
interest in the underlying stock, especially its price volatility, the issuer 
of the option may not be in a practical position to supply such informa-
tion. As an outsider, the issuer has ready access only to published 
sources, the accuracy of which could not be verified. 93 Moreover, price 
volatility information becomes crucial to the purchaser when he deals 
in "down-side-out" calls and "upside-down" puts. 9 4 In those cases, the 
SEC suggests disclosure of market fluctuations over ,appropriate tim~ 
periods.95 Finally, the option writer should not have to perform the 
buyer's research and market assessments for him.96 
B. Proposed Options Information Requirements 
Increased options activity and its incidental risks have prompted 
the SEC to propose rule 9b-2,97 which mandates more effective dis-
91. An endorser obligates himself to the buyer to deliver the underlying stock upon 
exercise of the call. 
92. Id. at 13-14. 
93 . Gates, supra note 2, at 438-39. This information would be readily obtainable 
if the underlying stock were registered. See Prospectus, supra note 15, at 13. 
94. Gates, supra note 2 at 439. These expiration price options involve a special 
risk that makes price volatility a major concern in triggering expiration. For regular 
options, however, the purchaser will gain as long as he exercises the option at a profit-
able point. 
95. In re Goldman, Sachs & Co., [1970-1971 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. 11 78,159. 
96. The Commission properly recognizes, however, that the option purchaser should 
be furnished information about writers' and endorsers' financial status. 
97. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2, 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FEn. SEc. 
L. REP. ~ 22,623 ( 197 4). Rule 9b-2, in relevant part, states: 
(a) Option Disclosure. It shall be unlawful for any broker ... to effect . . . 
the purchase or sale of any option unless, at least 48 hours prior to execution 
of such purchase or sale, the broker . . . has delivered or caused to be delivered 
to the customer (A) a written statement which prominently includes material 
setting forth the nature and extent of the obligations under, as well as the risks 
attendant to, the purchase or sale of such options generally, or (B) a prospec-
tus . . ., and unless the broker . . . delivers thereafter any supplemental writ-
ten statement necessary to make current the disclosures . . . before effecting 
any purchase or sale . . . . 
(b) Option Suitability. No broker .. . shall recommend to any customer-
( 1) any transaction in an option unless the broker . . . has reasonable grounds 
to believe that the entire recommended transaction is not unsuitable . . . or 
(2) the purchase of a [linlited price option] ... unless, in addition to com-
plying with the requirements of subparagraph (b) (1), the broker ... obtains 
1256 
Options Regulation 
closure, specific suitability standards, and, with respect to endorsers, 
accurate reporting and minimum net capital levels. 98 In addition, the 
Commission has proposed rule 238, which permits exemption from 
options registration if the security offered meets certain well-deline-
ated conditions. 99 The proposals effectuate the Commission's intent 
to construct more restrictive guidelines for investor protection as well 
as market efficiency.100 In a trading scheme fraught with high poten-
tial risks for unwary investors, the new standards respond to the two 
main criticisms usually leveled at the current registration method-that 
disclosure often reaches the investor after he has already committed 
to purchase, 101 and that he often does not understand the complexities 
of disclosures.102 
1. Disclosure.-Proposed rule 9b-2(a) would expand brokers' 
. . . from the customer such information . . . as to have reasonable grounds 
to believe . . . that the customer understands the special characteristics of such 
option. 
(c) Uncovered Calls and Offsetting Puts. No broker ... shall effect . .. 
any transaction whereby such customer writes [an uncovered option] . . . or 
[an offsetting put] ... unless, on the basis of information obtained by such 
broker, . . . after reasonable inquiry, ... he has a reasonable basis for believ-
ing that the customer . . . is capable of evaluating the additional risks in such 
transactions, and has the financial capability to meet reasonably foreseeable 
margin calls . . . . 
(d) Reporting Requirement. 
( 1) It shall be unlawful for any broker or dealer to endorse an option unless 
such broker or dealer files reports . . . . 
(2) Individual reports filed by ... brokers ... shall be considered nonpublic 
information . . . . 
(3) This paragraph (d) shall not apply to any option registered on a national 
securities exchange. 
(e) Net Capital Requirement. It shall be unlawful for any broker ... to en-
dorse . . . an option unless such broker . . . has net capital . . . of not less 
than $50,000 . . . . 
98. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9994 (Feb. 8, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 
4994 ( 1973 ), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 79,221. 
99. SEC Securities Act Release No. 5444 (Dec. 13, 1973 ), 39 Fed. Reg. 1283 
(1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 79,602; SEC Securities 
Act Release No. 5366 (Feb. 8, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 4993 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1T 79,222. The statutory basis for proposed rule 238 
is Securities Act of 1933 § 3(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (1970). 
100. The SEC has taken a similarly protective position with regard to another secu-
rities field involving high risks for investors. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 11,125 (Dec. 9, 1974), 39 Fed. Reg. 44,520 (1974), [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEc. 
L. REP. 1! 80,023 (warning to unscrupulous promoters and fraudulent schemes in the 
opening of the gold market); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,158 (Dec. 31, 
1974) , 40 Fed. Reg. 1520 (1975), [Current Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 1f 80,039 
(proposed rule 15c3-5 regulating the broker-customer relationship in gold trading) . 
101. See Heller, Disclosure Requirements Under Federal Securities Regulation, 16 
Bus. LAw. 300, 301-03 n.6 (1961 ). 
102. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Pro-
tection, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROD. 193, 209-12 (1958). 
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disclosure responsibilities by requiring that they furnish the customer, 
not later than forty-eight hours prior to ,the initial transaction, a written 
statement explaining the nature and extent of the customer's obligation 
and the risks involved in options trading. Previously, the Commission 
required brokers to disclose risk information about the companies they 
recommended for investment only when their own lack of essential in-
formation about the company engendered the risk.103 Recommenda-
tions about investment stocks conceivably brought to the broker-
customer relationship a special intimacy104 that deserved the careful 
scrutiny denied to options trading. The SEC also required that the 
prospectuses of new issues registered under the Securities Act disclose 
the risks implicit in speculative offerings.105 Options that are not 
traded on an exchange resemble new issues in that both are traded on 
a primary market. The broker, who usually does not write options, in-
stead assumes the role of underwriter. Because the option resembles 
a new issue, and the broker serves as its underwriter, 106 options inves-
tors should, logically, acquire information similar to that available in 
a new issue's prospectus. In the case of options traded on an exchange, 
the broker would satisfy proposed rule 9b-2(a) by supplying the client 
with the option issuer's prospectus (e.g., the prospectus of the OBOECC) 
before the forty-eight hour period.107 
Proposed rule 9b-2(a) would, however, impose stricter standards 
than does the present rule for new offerings. The Securities Act re-
quires that the prospectus only accompany or precede delivery of the 
security/08 the requirement has lost all utility to situations in which the 
buyer, relying on a broker's oral representations, commits himself to a 
purchase before seeing the prospectus.109 For disclosure to provide 
customers with the opportunity to make informed investment deci-
103. See SEC v. North American Research & Dev. Corp., 424 'F.2d 63 , 84 (2d Cir. 
1970); Hanly v. SEC, 415 F.2d 589,596-97 (2d Cir. 1969) . 
104. See cases cited note 103 supra. 
105. SEC Securities Act Release No. 4936 (Dec. 9, 1968), 33 Fed. Reg. 18,617 
( 1968 ) , [1 967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 77,636; see Securities 
Act of 1933 § 10, 15 U.S.C. § 77j (1970). See also Doman Helicopters, Inc., 41 S.E.C. 
431 , 439 & n.16 (1963) . 
106. Underwriters are liable for failing to disclose required information for new is-
sues. Securities Act of 1933 §§ 2(11) , 5, 15 U .S.C. §§ 77b(ll), 77e (1970) . 
107. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973 ) , 2 CCH FED. 
SEC. L. RE.~ 22,623 (1974). 
108. Securities Act of 1933 § 5b(2), 15 U.S.C. § 77e(b)(2) (1970). 
109. Jennings, supra note 102, at 210. Apparently, this mode of transaction repre-
sents the rule rather than the exception. See Anderson, The Disclosure Process in Fed-
eral Securities Regulation: A Brief R eview, 25 HASTINGS L. REv. 311, 325 n.71 (1974). 
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sions, 110 there must be adequate time for deliberation; accordingly, 
some commentators have favored requiring disclosure at least forty-
eight hours prior to purchase.111 The SEC has not demanded prepur-
chase disclosure for transactions involVing new stock issues, 11 2 but the 
complexities of options markets and the potential for abuse will likely 
move the Commission to adopt such a requirement for the options trad-
ing scheme.11 3 Furthermore, the classic arguments against prepur-
chase disclosure lose force when applied to options trading. First, the 
disclosure requirement would not always hamper options trade spon-
taneity,114 because proposed rule 9b-2(a) applies only to the custom-
er's initial transaction. If the broker anticipates timed t11ading, 115 he 
may furnish blanket disclosures for all or some of his clientele; the dis-
closure requirement would then impede timed trading only when new 
customers enter the market. Second, the cost should not be prohibi-
tive, 116 because the broker need only provide one full disclosure to each 
customer, and subsequent sales would merely necessitate an updating 
of information.117 
The effectiveness of proposed rule 9b-2(a) will depend upon the 
solution of several potential problems. To avoid delays in timed sales 
and simultaneously to reduce disclosure costs, the broker might provide 
only one explanatory prospectus, notwithstanding proposed rule 9b-2 
(a)(B), 11 8 which arguably requires a prospectus for each exchange li-
censed to issue options-at present, two (one for the CBOE and one 
110. See In re Tucker Corp., 26 S.E.C. 249 (1947) ; Anderson, supra note 109, at 
312&n.4. 
111. See, e.g., Pringle, Summary Prospectus Proposal of Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners Association, 23 Bus. LAw. 567, 569 (1968) . 
112. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.434a (1974); SEC Securities Act Release No. 4968 (April 
24, 1969) , 34 Fed. Reg. 7235 (1969) , [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. 11 77,685 (preliminary prospectus received forty-eight hours before the mailing of 
the confirmation of sales) ; cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (1 974) ; SEC Securities Act Release 
No. 5397 (June 1, 1973) , [1973 Tra!lsfe r Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 79,385 
(stock-offering circulars governed by a forty-eight-hour requirement). 
113. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9994 (Feb. 8, 1973) , 38 Fed. 
Reg. 4994 (1973 ), [1972-1 973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,221. 
114. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,550 (Dec. 13, 1973 ) , 38 Fed. 
Reg. 35,334 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 11 79,601; 
Pringle, supra note 111 , at 568. 
115. In timed sales the investor's profit depends upon the broker's executing the order 
at the proper time. Such an investor might lose a portion of that hoped-for profit on 
his initial trade if be must wait forty-eight hours before the broker may execute his 
order. 
116. Pringle, supra note 111 , at 568. 
117. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a) , 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP.1122,623 (1974) . 
118. ld. § 240.9b-2(a)(B). 
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for the American Stock Exchange) and, foreseeably, several others. 
Alternatively, brokers may disclose information on "the purchase ... 
of such options generally,"m which suggests that one prospectus would 
suffice, an interpretation more desirable in light of both delay and cost 
objections. Furthermore, the complexity and potential abuse of op-
tions trading actually necessitates disclosure, not the fiscal strength of 
the exchange's clearing corporation. The prospectus of any one ex-
change, therefore, should apprise the customer of the nature and risks 
of options trading, and the broker should supply needed financial data 
about the exchange's clearing corporation in the conventional manner, 
upon delivery of the securities.120 
The proposed rule also permits the broker to deliver supplemental 
material after the beginning of the forty-eight-hour period and before 
the purchase.121 Apparently, nothing prevents him from furnishing an 
essentially useless statement, followed, at the time of purchase, by a 
more informative supplement-a procedure that would deny the cus-
tomer an adequate inspection and would, in effect, render the proposed 
rule self-defeating.122 To sidestep this loophole requires interpreting 
"supplemental written statement" to include all inform,ation acquired 
by the broker after delivery of the initial disclosure statement, neces-
sarily excluding any information already known to the broker at the 
time of the initial delivery. Still, the proposed 9b-2(a) requires only 
that the broker have "delivered or caused to be delivered to the cus-
tomer" the disclosure statement in advance of the forty-eight-hour 
period. 1 ~3 Conceivably, the broker might orally explain the risks to the 
customer, and then mail the statement and execute a sale after waiting 
forty-eight hours, so that the customer might receive the statement after 
any usefulness had waned-a result that obviously clashes with the aim 
of the proposed rule. 124 The Commission could avoid this hazard by 
interpreting the delivery phrase to require that the customer actually 
119. /d. § 240.9b-2(a)(A). 
120. The CBOE's informative prospectus will probably serve as the model for other 
exchanges' prospectuses. 3 H. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES AND FEDERAL CORPORATE 
LAw§ 2.21[6], at 2-58.10 (1975). 
121. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. 11 22,623 ( 197 4). 
122. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,550 (Dec. 13, 1973), 38 Fed. 
Reg. 35,334 (1973), [1973-1974 Transfe r Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 79,601. 
123. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2 (a), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP. 11 22,623 (197 4). 
124. See SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 10,550 (Dec. 13, 1973 ) , 38 Fed. 
Reg. 35,334 (1973) , [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP.1[79,601. 
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receive the statement no later than forty-eight hours prior to the pur-
chase.125 The proposed disclosure requirement, in its present form, 
although intended to guarantee customers the prepurchase information 
necessary for a knowledgeable investment decision, may have no pro-
tective effects in the important context of an investor's first transaction. 
The proposed rule presents a final problem: the customer may 
neither read nor understand the statement. 126 Options trading can 
attract small investors because options are available for a small per-
centage of the underlying stock's price. Many of these purchasers 
may not fully comprehend options complexities. Nevertheless, im-
position of disclosure standards on options transactions might prove 
as ineffectual a remedy as have such standards for new offerings. 
The effectiveness of the disclosure rule, therefore, will depend on 
another section of the proposed regulation, its suitability rule, 127 which 
purports to assure that the broker will actually impart an understanding 
of options mechanics to his customer. 
2. Suitability.-The first SEC suitability rule applicable to all 
types of securities, rule 15b10-3,128 was adopted in 1967.129 In 1974 
the SEC promulgated an alternative suitability rule, emphasizing the in-
vestor's capacity to evaluate a specific investment.130 The general suit-
ability rule requires that, before recommending a transaction, the broker 
must have a reasonable basis to believe, after inquiry, that the transaction 
will not inordinately drain the client's financial resources.131 The pro-
125. Rule 256, which requires forty-eight-hour notice of an offering circular, does 
require receipt by the customer before the fo rty-eight-hour period. 17 C.P.R. § 230.256 
(a)(2) ( 1974 ) . Because the substantially different wording in rule 256 may warrant 
a different interpretation of proposed rule 9b-2(a), cj. Dickenson v. Fletcher, L.R. 9 
C.P. 1, 7-8 (1873) (change in language of subsequent statute in pari materia creates 
different meaning), the SEC should revise proposed rule 9b-2(a) so that it requires ac-
tual receipt of a prospectus by the customer. 
126. See Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 171-72 
(1933). 
127. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b) , 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973) , 2 CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. 11 22,623 (1974). 
128. 17 C.P.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1974). 
129. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 8135 (July 27, 1967) , 32 Fed. Reg. 
11,637 (1967) , [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.1177,459. 
130. SEC Reg.§ 230.146(d) , 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1974) , 1 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 
112710 (1974). 
131. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b)-(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973) , 2 CCH 
FED. SEc. L. REP. 11 22,623 (1974 ). The suitabili ty rule in other areas of law requires 
an express representation that the transact ion suits the client's needs. See Anderson v. 
Knox, 297 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1961) , cert. denied, 370 U.S. 915 (1962) (sale of in-
surance). In the securities industry, however, such a representation inheres in the 
broker-customer relationship. E. WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS 
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posed suitability rule includes two modifications132 with respect to two 
kinds of options-the limited price option, which expires before the 
term if the price of the underlying stock reaches a certain level, and 
the uncovered, or "naked," option, which permits the writer to forego 
purchasing the underlying stock and exposes both writer and endorser 
to an unlimited loss. The proposed rule would require that, upon rec-
ommending a trade in a limited price option, the broker must have 
reasonable grounds for believing that the customer understands its 
mechanics. 133 The broker dealing in uncovered options must also 
reasonably conclude that his customer can evaluate the risks and bear 
the loss, regardless of any broker recommendations. 134 
Despite their paternalistic purpose, sections (b) and (c) of pro-
posed rule 9b-2 suffer from the failure to provide standards for determin-
ing what constitutes reasonable grounds for belief that the customer 
either understands or has the capacity to evaluate. The limited-price op-
tion requirement, for example, neglects to explain the appropriate test for 
determining a customer's level of expertise. Neither by merely asking 
the customer whether he understands the mechanics nor by orally ex-
plaining limited options to him can the broker objectively ascertain that 
the customer does, in fact, comprehend. An oral presentation could 
also present subsequent evidentiary problems should the customer con-
veniently fail to remember its salience. On the other hand, a more 
definite method, such as an oral or written test, might offend the cus-
AND DEALERS 184-85 (1965). The National Association of Securities Dealers, a self-
regulatory, private association of brokers organized under section 15 of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 780-3 (1970), has long enforced a suitability re-
quirement based solely upon the personal financial information supplied by the client. 
Boren & Co., 40 S.E.C. 217, 227 (1960). Some federal courts, however, have refused 
to enforce the NASD rule, holding, instead, that its violation would not engender federal 
civil liability, but may, when asserted under a federal court's pendent jurisdiction, consti-
tute evidence in support of a common Jaw claim of negligence or breach of fiduciary 
duty. See Hecht v. Harris, Upham & Co., 430 F.2d 1202, 1209 (9th Cir. 1970); 
Mercury Investment Co. v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, 295 F. Supp. 1160, 1163 (S.D. Tex. 
1969). See also Twomey v. Mitchum, Jones & Templeton, Inc., 262 Cal. App. 2d 690, 
700-01, 69 Cal. Rptr. 222, 232-33 (Ct. App. 1968). . 
132. Compare Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b)-(c), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 
2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 1f 22,623 (1974), with 17 C.F.R. § 240.15b10-3 (1974). 
There are two minor differences between rule 15b10-3 and proposed rule 9b-2(b): first, 
by omission of the word "security" rule 9b-2 (b) avoids interpreting whether a put quali-
fies as a security; and second, unlike rule 15b10-3, proposed rule 9b-2'(b) applie~ to all 
brokers and dealers, not just nonmembers of the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers. 
133. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(b), 38 Fed. Reg. 35,334 (1973), 2 CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP.1f 22,623 (1974). 
134. /d. § 240.9b-2(c). 
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tomer. Rule 146(d),135 the suitability standard for private offerings, 
requires only that the broker determine the customer's ability to evalu-
ate the risk or bear the loss. Accordingly, a nonoptions broker may 
limit his inquiry to easily verifiable financial records and eschew the 
subjective considerations. In uncovered options writing, the SEC 
would require the broker to investigate further into subjective charac-
teristics. Administrative or judicial formulation of a uniform standard 
for rating investors' comprehension should alleviate many suitability 
problems for brokers. 
3. Reporting and Capital Requirements.-The remainder of 
proposed rule 9b-2 addresses reporting and net capital requirements.135 
Under proposed rule 9b-2(e), a broker who endorses an option must 
maintain a net capitalization of $50,000.137 Failure to comply with the 
net capital requirement would result in suspension138 or revocation139 
of the broker's registration. This provision, although similar to rule 
15c3-1, 140 effectively comprehends the special risks of options trading. 
Proposed rule 9b-2(d)141 would aid in enforcing the net capital re-
quirement by compelling the broker to report weekly the number and 
kind of options he endorses and report monthly his total number of un-
exercised options. From the SEC's standpoint, strict adherence to the 
reporting requirements is essential to the protection of investors;142 
accordingly, falsification of records carries a severe penalty, the revoca-
135. SEC Reg. § 230.146(d) , 39 Fed. Reg. 15,261 (1973), 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
~ 2710 (1974). 
136. Proposed SEC Reg. § 240.9b-2(d)-(e), 38 Fed. Reg. 35.334 (1973), 2 CCH 
FED. SEC. L. RE . ~ 22,623 (1974). 
137. The $50,000 capital requirement provides a drawing fund for the option holder 
should he choose to exercise the option. 
138. Cf. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9416 (Dec. 13, 1971), 
[1971-1972 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. ~ 78,468 (rule 15c3-1 net capital 
requirement). 
139. See Blaise D'Antoni & Assoc., Inc. v. SEC, 289 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 368 U.S. 889 (1961). 
140. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c;:3-1(a)(4) (1974). The rule requires a minimum $2,500 
in net capital, and permits a 2000% indebtedness for brokers and dealers who meet spec-
ified conditions. Rule 15c3-1 (b) (2) exempts brokers who deal on the six named ex-
changes that employ a net capital requirement in excess of that contemplated by the rule. 
The CBOE is one such exchange. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9988 (Feb. 
2, 1973) , 38 Fed. Reg. 4315 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. 
REP. ~ 79,213. The statutory basis for proposed rule 9b-2(e) is the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934 §§ 9(b) , 15(c)(3), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78o(c)(3) (1970). 
141. The statutory basis for proposed rule 9b-2(d) is Securities Exchange Act of 
1934 §§ 9(b) , 17(a), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b), 78q(a) (1970). 
142. SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9468 (Jan. 27, 1972), [1971-1972 
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. RE.~ 78,498. 
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tion of registration. 143 A customer may invoke proposed rule 9b-2 as 
a basis for imposing civil liability upon the broker. Prior decisions144 
held that civil liability could not depend on section 9b, because it only 
prohibited options transactions conducted "in contravention of such 
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe."145 
4. Exemptions.-To relieve somewhat the issuers' burden in 
options registration, the SEC has considered adopting an exemption that 
would eliminate options registration and reduce unnecessary costs in 
those cases involving suitably protected investors. Because most of the 
registration information elicited by the purchaser deals with the natur~ 
of transaction risks and endorsers' finances, proposed rule 9b-2, by al-
ready requiring these disclosures, offers the ideal justification for an ex-
emption. Proposed rule 23 8 permits exemption from registering 
options, other than limited price options,146 if (1) the issuer of the un-
derlying stock satisfies the reporting requirements;147 (2) the issuer of 
the underlying security registers the securities; (3) the options issuer 
does not also issue the underlying stock; (4) the endorser is a 
registered dealer; and (5) the gross sales aggregate of all "related op-
tions" does not exceed $500,000. The SEC defines "related options" 
as an underlying stock's total number of either puts or calls that expire 
in the same month. Thus, for purposes of proposed rule 238, a put 
would not be "related" to a call: puts and calls would be considered 
separately. 
Proposed rule 238 promises several effects. The SEC's definition 
of "issuers" as including both options writers and endorsers would 
143. See In re Leo G. MacLaughlin Sec. Co., SEC Securities Exchange Act Release 
No. 7783 (Jan. 5, 1966), [1964-1966 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 77,317; 
In re Woods & Co., 41 S.E.C. 725 (1963). 
144. Wolfson v. Parkway Management Co., [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEc. L. REP. ~ 91 ,967, at 96,294 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Subsequent option traders have 
failed to establish a 9b cause of action in the absence of relevant rule. 
145. 15 u.s.c. § 78i(b) (1970) . 
146. The original proposed rule 238 also exempted limited price options. SEC Secu-
rities Act Release No. 5366 (Feb. 8, 1973) , 38 Fed. Reg. 4993 (1973), [1972-1973 
Transfer Binder] CCH FEn. SEc . L. REP. ~ 79,222. The SEC considers them so spec-
ulative, however, that exemption from the disclosure requirements is not warranted. As 
a result, limited price options will probably disappear. See Frankhauser, Options Regu-
lation, 7 REV. OF SEC. REGULATION 887, 888 (1974 ) . 
147. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 §§ 13, 15(d), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78o(d) 
(1970). The CBOE is exempt from the reporting requirements. SEC Securities Ex-
change Act Release No. 10,483 (Nov. 7, 1973) ; SEC Securities Act Release No. 5444 
(Dec. 13, 1973), 39 Fed. Reg. 1283 (1974), [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. ~ 79,602, at 83,616. Thus, proposed rule 238 does not apply to CBOE 
options. 
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appear to restrict the number of writers per endorser and the number 
of endorsers per writer, because aggregate sales must not exceed the 
rule's limit. This apparent ceiling on the permissible number of en-
dorsers and writers is probably artificial, however, inasmuch as small 
premiums permit enormous trade volumes before reaching the 
$500,000 gross sales level. The proposed rule's requirement that a 
registered dealer endorse the option to qualify it for exemption might 
destroy the over-the-counter options market by inducing dealers to en-
dorse the more stable exchange options.148 The collapse of the over-
the-counter market might not seriously affect total options market 
volume, but it would severely limit the number of stocks represented by 
exchange options. On balance, however, the rule 238 exemption would 
likely remove needless restrictions from some options transactions and 
generally expedite registration procedures. Because an issuer must 
register on the exchange that trades his security, 149 rule 23 8 also raises 
the possibility of double registration. Without an exemption, the SEC 
would probably compel an exchange to register both the options and 
the underlying security, because the issuer, for example, the CBOECC, is 
also the vehicle through which purchasers exercise options.150 An 
amendment to rule 12a-6,151 directed especially at options exchanges, 
exempts the underlying security in situations in which (1) the issuer regis-
ters the option, (2) the exchange deals in the underlying stock only when 
exercising the option, and ( 3 ) the issuer of the underlying stock has 
registered it elsewhere. This rule effectively eliminates all exchange 
double registration problems. 
IV. Margin Requirements 
Although the SEC regulates the securities industry to protect the 
investor, Congress authorized the FRB to regulate the amount of credit 
that a lender may extend for securities trading, 152 to prevent a misal-
location of the nation's credit resources into a speculative securities 
market. 153 The FRB has adopted several rules154 regulating margin, 
148. See Frankhauser, .supra note 146. 
149. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 12(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78/(a) (1970). 
150. Prospectus, supra note 15, at 22-26. 
151. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-6 (1974); see SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
10,123 (April 26, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 11,448 (1973), [1973 Transfer Binder] CCH 
FED. SEC. L. REP. 1! 79,354. 
152. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 78g (1970) . 
153. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, SECURITIES EXCHANGE 
BILL oF 1934, H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1934). 
154. Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220 (1975), governs credit extended by brokers; Reg-
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a credit device that enables customers to purchase securities for a per-
centage of the purchase price. By means of this "down payment," the 
purchaser becomes equitable owner of the security, which remains in 
the lender's possession. The borrower never pledges payment of the 
balance; instead he must continue to match fluctuations in the "down 
payment" percentage caused by FRB rule changes. 155 The purchaser 
also must pay interest on the amount of the purchase price balance bor-
rowed from his broker, but he need not pay the principal unless he 
desires physical possession of the shares.156 Under Regulation T, the 
customer may have two accounts-a general, or margin, account, 1 57 and 
a special, or nonmargin, account.158 Registered and exempt securities 
in the general account have a loan value based on a percentage of their 
current market value. The customer must maintain sufficient cash and 
loan value in the general account to cover the "down payment" on his 
margin securities. Unavoidably, loan value may sink below the proper 
level because of the effect of market fluctuations on the value of securi-
ties in the general account. Accordingly, failure to restore the "down 
payment" level within five business days after notification by a margin 
call159 authorizes the broker to sell sufficient securities in the general 
account to restore compliance with the margin requirement.160 In con-
trast, the special account enables the broker to extend credit on the 
security's full purchase price for seven business days, after which the 
customer must pay the full purch_ase price.161 
The FRB recently listed four limitations on the use of options in 
the margin context:162 options have no loan value; they are not 
unissued securities; they may not serve as exchangeable securities in 
short sales; and they may not be used for arbitrage. Through these 
rulings the Board effectively discriminates between options and other 
ulation U, 12 C.P.R. § 221 (1975), governs credit extended by banks; and Regulation 
G, 12 C.P.R. § 207 (1975), governs credit extended by other lenders. 
155. 12 C.P.R. § 220.3 (1975). 
156. ld. § 220.3b-2. 
157. Id. § 220.3. 
158. ld. § 220.4. 
159. A margin call notifies the customer that the loan value of his general account 
has less value than the current PRB margin requirement for the shares he bought on 
margin. 
160. 12 C.P.R. § 220.3e (1975). 
161. A customer who attempts to use the special account to avoid the margin require-
ment by buying and selling the stock within the seven-day period without depositing the 
full purchase price may not again use his special account for ninety days. 12 C.P.R. 
§ 220.4c8 (1975). 
162. 12 C.P.R. § 220.126 (1975) . 
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securities and unfortunately misses an opportunity to appraise options 
in margin accounts on an experimental basis. 
A. Loan Value 
The FRB, acting to prevent speculation leading to a volatile 
options market or to a disruption of the underlying securities market, 163 
determined that puts and calls have no loan value.164 The old margin 
requirements emphasized that loan value could derive only from 
exempt and registered securities, 1 65 in addition to any over-the-counter 
securities approved by the FRB.16 6 Before the birth of the CBOE, puts 
and calls fell outside this category. CBOE options, however, are reg-
istered securities and merit loan value like any other security.167 The 
FRB's disparate treatment of options may evolve from the possibility 
that exchange options would generate double leverage if assigned loan 
value. Even without the margin benefit, options procure the specula-
tive use of the underlying stock at a cost much less than that required 
for an investment in the stock itself. If options were marginable, an 
even smaller capital outlay would generate profit or loss on the underly-
ing stock's price fluctuations. Double leverage would undoubtedly 
attract investors and make exchanges more attractive to the large insti-
tutions that generally disdain options writing because of the small 
volume. On the other hand, the FRB does not favor extending credit 
163. See Gates, supra note 2, at 457. 
164. 59 FED. RESERVE BuLL. 448-49 (1973) ; Regulation G, 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(a) 
(1975) ; Regulation T, 12 C.F.R. § 220.8(f) (1975) ; Regulation U, 12 C.F.R. § 221.4 
(a ) (1975). The FRB's authority over credit for securities extended by banks stems 
from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 7(d) , 15 U.S.C. § 78g(d) (1970) , which 
grants power only over "equity securities," as defined in the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 § 3(a)(11) , 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(ll) (1970). The FRB had doubted whether 
options were "equity securities." In light of the emergence of the CBOE, the SEC clari-
fied the issue by amending rule 3all-1 to include puts and calls wi~hin the definition 
of "equity security," to emphasize that the FRB had power to regulate the extension of 
options credit by banks. 17 C.F.R. § 240.3a ll-1 (1974) ; SEC Securities Exchange Act 
Release No. 10,129 (April 27, 1973) , 38 Fed. Reg. 11 ,449 (1973) , [1973 Transfer 
Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. ~ 79,356; SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 
9929 (Jan. 29, 1973), 38 Fed. Reg. 3339 (1973), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. 
SEC. L. REP. 11 79,196. 
165. See 59 FED. REsERVE BuLL. 448 (1973). 
166. 12C.F.R. § 220.2(e) (1975). 
167. See Gates, supra note 2, at 456. CBOE options clearly come within the defini-
tion of "equity security." See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 3 (a) (11 ) , 15 U.S.C. 
§ 78c(a)(ll) (1970); SEC Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973), 
38 Fed. Reg. 3339 (1973 ), [1972-1973 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 
11 79,196. Regulation T adopts this definition, 12 C.F.R. § 220.2(h) n.2 (1975) , and 
includes these securities within the general account, 12 C.F .R. § 220.3 (a) ( 1975). 
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to foster speculation. The Board has acted in the past to restrict specu-
lation, 168 and the speculation precipitated by the noTelty of an options 
market may subside in part because of the FRB's refusal to attach loan 
value to options. 
The decision to deny loan value was unwise in that it represents 
an inconsistent application of a possibly unjustifiable proscription. The 
FRB cannot convincingly support its claim that buying options on mar-
gin affects the volatility of the options market169 or the underlying se-
curities market.170 The CBOE's experimental stage posed the ideal 
opportunity for testing the effects of buying options on margin; at 
present, the volume, the number of investors, and the number of under-
lying stocks are all relatively small, so that any double leverage adver-
sities have little long-range effect. Arguably, the FRB and the SEC 
have both decided to exclude margin considerations from the options 
experiment in order to assure more accurate experimental results. At 
any rate, the deficiencies caused by administrative failure to estimate 
economic effects properly are not irreparable, and the FRB can still 
reconsider and permit options purchases on margin. 
The FRB decision to deny loan value to options, however, 
registers unfavorably for another reason. The no-loan policy logically 
conflicts with the FRB's treatment of listed warrants-the rights issued 
by a corporation to acquire its securities171-that the FRB interprets 
as having loan value.172 Exchange calls will probably play no greater 
part in generating speculative fever than listed warrants, even though 
there are many more calls than warrants to trade. Furthermore, puts 
168. See 48 FED. REsERVE BuLL. 840 (1962). 
169. The commodity futures market treats the •underlying security" as a commodity; 
otherwise it evinces the same characteristics and volatility as the options market. In 
the futures market, however, the customer actually buys or sells the commodity for 
future delivery. The commodity broker may, without FRB interference, extend credit 
to his customer. See Commodity Exchange Act§ 4d(2), 7 U.S.C. § 6d(2) (1970); 17 
C.F.R. § 1.30 (1974 ). Puts and calls of futures are forbidden. Commodity Futures 
Trading Commission Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-463, § 402 (Oct. 23, 1974), amending 
7 U.S.C. § 6c (1970). 
170. Some listed warrants, and select over-the-counter warrants, both of which re-
semble call options (except that they are usually of longer duration), may be purchased 
on margin accounts. See 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c)(3) (1975); 2 CCH FED. SEc. L. REP. 
1[22,210, at 16,109 (1974). No disruptive effects have been traced to double leverage. 
171. 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-4(a)(1) (1974). See also Miller v. General Outdoor Ad-
vertising Co., 223 F. Supp. 790, 794 (S.D.N.Y. 1963); 17 C.F.R. § 240.12a-4(a)(1) 
(1974) . 
172. 12 C.F.R. § 220.3(c)(3) (1975). 
It must be noted, however, that the period during which warrants may be exercised 
is typically much longer than the time usually allowed for options. Warrants are there-
fore somewhat less speculative. 
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and calls are the only specific type of security lacking loan value in a 
general account.173 From the viewpoint of an options customer who 
wishes only to invest in the secondary options market and not exercise 
the option, 174 little difference exists between an exchange's option and 
any other security, aside from the option's smaller price. Because most 
options traders invest on a small scale, 175 the FRB's discrimination be-
tween options traders and traders of other securities favors the wealthy. 
Although the rule may succeed in limiting the losses of small traders 
who succumb to ill-advised gambling, margin calls provide a better and 
less restrictive method. The Board has found no evidence that an infu-
sion of numerous small investors-lured into the market by the 
prospects of double leverage-will increase speculative fever. Con-
ceivably, the Board is keying on the inability of some customers to pay 
the option's price upon expiration. Margin calls eliminate potential 
damage caused by defaulting customers, inasmuch as brokers may sell 
the options while the account's value level sufficiently covers the obliga-
tions. Because the FRB allows customers to buy the options through 
a special account, 176 essentially an extension of short-term credit, the 
Board apparently does not view customer default as a primary concern. 
Accordingly, no justification emerges for the Board's interdictory policy, 
which amounts to an unauthorized encroachment on the SEC's province 
of protecting investors. 
8. Unissued Securities 
The Board has also determined that an option is not an unissued 
security. The payment period-seven business days for a special 
account-does not commence until after the writer issues the secu-
rity.177 For the first sale of an exchange option, the option may be tech-
nically unissued because writing precedes issuance. A few days' delay 
is common. The FRB demurred from extending the credit period on 
the basis of such a technicality, 178 ruling that puts and calls do not qual-
ify as unissued securities.179 Though probably beneficent, the Board's 
173. 12 C.P.R. § 220.8(f) (1975). 
174. The majority of option traders do not intend to exercise their options. Wax, 
SEC Focused Anew on Options Trading, 219 CoM. & FINANCIAL CHRONICLE, Jan. 28, 
1974, at 2, col. 2. 
175. See Berton, supra note 1, at 25. 
176. 12 C.P.R. § 220.126(b) (1975). 
177. ld. § 220.4(c)(3) . 
178. See id. § 220.118 (mutual funds). 
179. ld. § 220.126(c). 
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rationale lacks clarity. It may indeed prove. difficult to ascertain the 
beginning of the seven-day period, but the. detennination seems irrele-
vant. The FRB can discipline a customer who takes advantage of issu-
ance delay and violates the margin rules by withdrawing from the trans-
action before the' end of the period. by imposing a ninety-day freeze 
on the customer's account. 180 The FRB may have formulated the rule 
to protect its no-loan provisions: if options were treated as unissued 
securities, options investors epuld Qbtain short-term credit over a long 
and indefinite period and effectively bypass the no-loan rule. Further-
more, the FRB customarily denies Qredit usages in primary markets, 
which deal exclusively in unissued securities.181 The options market, 
however, presented the curious admixture of both issued and unissued 
securities, in response to -which the Board elected to abjure the sec-
ondary characteristics in favor of treating options exclusively as a 
primary market that traded solely in unissued securities. In the hybrid 
options market it is more difficult to detennine whether a particular 
customer's option is new, issued, or unissued. The FRB's refusal to 
classify options as unissued securities, therefore, effectively liberates 
brokers and the clearing corporation from plaguing technical dis-
tinctions.182 
C. Exchangeable Securities in Short Sales 
The FRB decided that calls do not qualify as securities, at least 
in the same sense that some securities may be exchanged for other se-
curities in margin accounts for short sales.183 The broker may, on gen-
eral account, accept exchangeable securities, including warrants, in lieu 
of the margin requirement for short sales, 184 inasmuch as these securi-
ties entitle the holder to the same type of securities as those sold by 
the short seller. The FRB's position again differs from its stance on 
warrants. The use of calls rather than securities-e.g., in "against the 
box" trades, when the sale and purchase of the same type of securi-
ties are not cancelled out-requires a much smaller cash commitment 
and of course extends leverage. Consequently, a ruling that calls are 
Rot exchangeable securities apparently furthers the FRB's stated pur-
180. See id. § 220.4(c)(8). 
181. See id. § 220.118. 
182. In exercising an option, the CBOECC selects a writer at random. Prospectus, 
supra note 15, at 8. 
183. 12 C.P.R.§ 220.126(d)-(e) (1975). 
184. !d.§ 220.3(d)(3). 
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pose, preventing traders on the short side from exerting more influence 
than traders on the long side for the same amount of funds. 185 Permit-
ting investors to use warrants as exchangeable securities, however, runs 
counter to the treatment of options, and the FRB should have ·extended 
the benefits to bc;>th warrants and calls. Identifying warrants as 
exchangeable securities might suggest that the FRB intends the rule 
as a guarantee that the short sale will be cov.ered, except that both 
warrants and calls already serve that purpose. The real aim of the rule 
must be to foreclose options' loan value. 
D. Arbitrage 
The FRB prohibits the use of options for arbitrage. The arbitrage 
rule-as it relates to a given security, or its counterpart, if convertible 
within ninety days-allows the purchase of the security in one market, 
and the sale in another market, without necessitating additional margin 
payments.186 Ideally, the rule enables a customer to take better ad-
vantage of price differentials on the two exchanges. Frequent use of 
arbitrage thus stabilizes the pric;e1 8 7 by fostering uniformity among the 
various exchanges. Read literally, the rule could apply to options, but 
the FRB has dictated differently, 1 88 reasoning instead that options cus-
tomers would use the procedure as a device for hedging, 189 and that 
any benefits would accrue solely to individual investors, not to the 
market as a whole.190 Again, however, the FRB permits the customer 
to use warrants for hedging and arbitrage purposes.191 Furthermore, 
the arbitrage technique would carry limited utility in the underlying 
185. 12 C.P.R. § 220.126(e) (1975). The FRB surmises that subjecting both long 
and short transactions to the same rules would create a market decline. Consequently, 
in an attempt to impede short selling and encourage buying long, the Board has imposed 
various restrictions, such as permitting short sales only in a market in which the last 
sale was for a price higher than the preceding sale. 
186. ld. Ordinarily, such -a transaction involves a purchase on one exchange and a 
short sale on the other. Without the rule, a customer would have to fulfill the margin 
requirements at both exchanges; under the rule, he need only sustain the margin require-
ment for one transaction and need not provide additional funds to match the margin 
requirement at the other exchange. 
187. 12 C.P.R.§ 220.126(f) (1974). 
188. Id. 
189. Hedging is a trading strategy designed to yield income regardless of the direction 
of market fluctuations. For example, if a shareholder suspects the market will rise, he 
purchases a put at the current striking price. If the stock appreciates, he lets the put 
expire and sells the stock. If the price falls, he exercises the put. The cost of this flexi-
bility is the price of the premium. 
190. 12 C.P.R. § 220.126(f) (1975). 
191. ld. § 220.4(d). 
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market: unless the premium were less than the difference between the 
striking price and the current market price, which is uncommon, the 
increased premium expense would discourage many investors, inas-
much as trading in the underlying security would involve less expense. 
Arbitrage in options trading would clearly stabilize options prices; op-
tions arbitrage thus serve a legitimate function in the options market. 
Moreover, the investor cannot use the technique to evade margin 
requirements because, in taking advantage of the price differential, the 
two transactions would always cancel. The customer can succeed in 
this plan only by exercising the option, which requires payment of the 
full purchase price.192 
V. Conclusion 
Recently the securities regulatory agencies have initiated vigorous 
implementation of the congressional mandate to protect the public and 
the economy. The resulting paternalism has manifested itself in 
numerous recent securities developments. Two circumstances have 
equipped the options market as the most suitable laboratory for testing 
the SEC's newest ideas in experimental reform: the market probably 
needs the SEC's guardianship, and, additionally, options trading is so 
new that resistance to the SEC's intermeddling is somewhat unorgan-
ized and underfinanced. Most SEC activity has been designed to pro-
tect investors, only the most knowledgeable of whom are commonly 
able to trade options to their own advantage. The SEC adopted rule 
9b-1 so that the Commission could properly supervise formulation of 
options exchanges' rules, then declared that options qualify as securities 
so that disclosure would accompany options registration and, finally, 
proposed rule 9b-2 so that prospective purchasers would know, in 
advance, about certain dangers in options trading. Meanwhile, the 
FRB peremptorily withdrew options from the credit market by prevent-
ing their use in margin accounts and likewise withdrew options from 
the securities market by disallowing their use in covering short sales 
and arbitrage. 
In its haste to protect investors, the SEC drafted an options regula-
tion plan containing several faults. First, rule 9b-1 fails clearly to vest 
·the SEC with proper authority to initiate rule changes subsequent to 
its approval of an exchange's initial trading plan. The rule's language 
192. See id. § 220.126(b)(2). 
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might create loopholes that leave the SEC powerless to intervene 
with the spontaneity necessary to monitor its experimental reg-
ulatory scheme effectively: as a condition to SEC supervision of the 
approved plan, the rule may instead require affirmative exchange 
action in amending its initial plan. Second, proposed rule 9b-2 fails 
to guarantee needed risk disclosure to the customer before he commits 
himself to the trade. An unscrupulous broker may disclose scanty in-
formation before the beginning of the forty-eight-hour period and 
reveal the required balance of information in a supplemental statement 
issued at the latest possible moment, when the customer has no oppor-
tunity to benefit from the disclosure. Third, proposed rule 9b-2 would 
not arm the broker with a clear standard for determining whether an 
options trade is suitable. The broker must ascertain whether the cus-
tomer understands the options trade, but the standard of reasonable-
ness is vague and may necessitate judicial clarification. 
The SEC's new rules suggest that the agency may view the options 
market as a proving ground for untried theories of exchange regulation 
and investor protection. By intruding into a market conspicuously lack-
ing powerful, entrenched interests, the SEC perhaps is calculating the 
precedential leverage that will facilitate later incursions into the securi-
ties industry. The SEC may anticipate applying its investor-protection 
latitude to a wide variety of securities fields. The SEC desires not only 
that brokers provide information to customers, but also that they pro-
vide the information in such a manner that it is instructive to customers 
before they make trading decisions. Congress likewise intended this 
effect, but the securities industry has successfully forestalled any SEC 
move to effectuate the congressional policy on the basis that the dis-
closure requirement should not inhibit timed .trading. The options 
market might present the SEC's ideal context for testing the disclosure 
requirement's feasibility before applying it in other securities areas. 
To meet Congress' mandate of protecting investors, the SEC has aug-
mented its previous disclosure requirements by requiring that investors 
must also be capable of evaluating the supplied information. In 
addition, for especially risky options transactions, the SEC will experi-
ment with a rule requiring that the investor actually understand before 
he trades. If the experiment succeeds and does not inhibit trading, 
the SEC may extend the requirement to its other suitability rules. Al-
though the SEC's role is undeniably paternalistic, the Commission has 
refused to protect investors to the extent of banning all options trading. 
Tm;- ead, to encourage the steady growth of options trading and create 
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a healthy ambience for investors, the Commission maintains appropri-
ate safeguards and, at the same time, preserves the high profit yield 
of options leverage. 
In contrast with the SEC's flexibility, the FRB has responded to 
options with rigid prohibitions. Rather than drafting thoughtful, pro-
tective devices to make certain the proper use of options in margin 
accounts, the Board has favored a sophistical interpretation that calls 
are not securities, even though warrants, essentially similar to calls, 
are securities. Similarly, the FRB has excluded the call from covering 
short trades and arbitrage maneuvers, although it has not rejected 
similar uses of warrants. Hopefully the Board will eventually recon-
sider the Regulation T options philosophy, an unlucky provision that 
runs counter to the SEC's recent strides in regulating options. The 
same two considerations that urged SEC action, both of which reflected 
the need to generate revenue during the recent, depressed economic 
period, may also activate the FRB. First, the brokerage industry 
needed increased revenue from commissions on trades. Extensive op-
tions trading practically guarantees commission revenue to the broker-
age industry by offering high returns to investors at a low capital outlay 
and thereby attracting an increased and varied clientele that would not 
ordinarily trade in conventional securities. Second, high-volume trad-
ing encourages options writing by large institutional investors in need 
of additional revenue to offset low dividends and portfolio losses. By 
isolating new traders from effective credit channels, the FRB has with-
drawn a large portion of the market's business and partially thwarted 
the efforts of the SEC. Options deserve treatment appropriate to 
modern investment times, including carefully scrutinized incorporation 
into margin acoounts, .and use of short sales and arbitrage procedures. 
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